Friday, October 3, 2008

A review of Islamic revolution- Part 8

** Please scroll down or check the links on the right side of the page for previous parts **

After completing his trainings, which included taking part in execution of a number of Syrian officers who were accused of activities against Asad’s government, Story of Mr. Shafizadeh continues in new direction with his return to Paris in the year 1977. In Paris, he meets Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Abolhassan Banisadr and Hassan Habibi who had come to airport with Gholambabbas Tavassoli to welcome him. This is when he becomes involved with Ghotbzadeh who, develops very close relationship with Jafar Shafizadeh and becomes his new mentor outside Iran. A new phase in the life of Jafar starts after that in which, he moves to Libya along with Mr. Ghotbzadeh to learn some new skills but before I get to that, let’s take a look at Sadegh Ghotbzadeh to see how he got there and what was his relation with Islamic revolution.

In order to understand how Sadegh Ghotbzadeh became a major role player in preparation for Islamic revolution and what was the nature of his relations with Shafizadeh, Khomeini and others, we need to take a look at Ghotbzadeh’s life and his family background. There are not many sources available to provide detailed information about family and life of Mr. Ghotbzadeh because he was not well known in Iranian politics and not many people have spoken about him. The best available source about this unusual figure, which I could get my hands on, is a book written by his last girl friend, Carole Jerome, a Canadian journalist who used to work for CBC. Carole Jerome has done some research on Ghotbzadeh’s life after he was executed by Khomeini and published that as part of a book that she wrote about Islamic revolution in 1987, named “The Man In The Mirror”. When I received this book from a friend the next year and read it, my first impression was that the author probably had exaggerated about the importance of Ghotbzadeh’s role in the revolution under influence of her feelings for him but when further information came out from other sources later on, proved this to be wrong.

Sadegh Ghotbzadeh was born to a bazaari family whose father Hussein Ghotbzadeh had friendship with Dr. Mohammad Mosadegh through common business interests in farming sector. According to Sadegh himself, he spent about two weeks with Dr. Mosadegh after he was released from prison to help him with some issues related to the trees in his Ahmadabad properties. Sadegh was about 10 years old at that time. Ghotbzadeh’s family, like most others of the same class in Iran, were religious but according to him, they were not too fanatic about their religious belief. As a result of his familiarity with late Dr. Mosadegh he developed a lot of sympathy towards Dr. Mosadegh and felt angry towards Shah. “Sadegh explained that he had grown up hating the Shah, yet his was not red-faced anger.” Carole Jerome says in her book.

Sadegh runs into trouble with Iranian police for anti-regime activities when in his early 20’s and is released after spending a night in detention. After that, his father decides to send him out for his studies. Ghotbzadeh moves to United States and after a couple of years, he is ordered by immigration office to leave. According to his girl friend Carole, the reason was his anti-Shah activities and his low grade average in the school. Ghotbzadeh had entered in “Confederation of Iranian Students” (CIS in short) right after he entered United States. This was a couple of years earlier than the time that an Iranian student had claimed that CIA had tried to recruit him for CIS. This matter became a big issue and caused some unpleasant reactions by Iranian government and the Shah, which was settled with Mr. Alam's and Mr. Ardeshir Zahedi’s intervention without getting to the Iranian national media. American embassy blamed it all on “Communists” who were trying to sabotage the relations between the two nations by accusing that student being in contact with East Germany’s government. From the strong reaction by late Shah himself, one may think that there had been enough justification for Iranian government to believe in credibility of the student’s claim. Mr. Zahedi had an interesting conversation with U.S. ambassador over this issue, which is partly reflected in embassy’s letter to State Department.

Ghotbzadeh left U.S. for France and shortly after, he came back with a Syrian passport with a name, which was slightly different. Not much longer his real identity was discovered by U.S. authorities and he was ordered to leave again. He contacted Robert Kennedy whom he had met before but he could not help Ghotbzadeh that time. After some struggles, he received an admission to enter a Canadian university in British Columbia to finish his studies in history and receive a BA degree. Ghotbzadeh then moved to France again and with the help of Banisadr, Nobari, Hassan Habibi and Ebrahim Yazdi (who worked with them from U.S.), created “Muslim Students Organization” in early 1970’s because they believed that CIS had been infiltrated by communists. This was right after the tension between U.S. government and Iran over the involvement of CIA in CIS.

*** Part 1 of the documents which show how Iranian security agency or SAVAK could successfully identify the main source which was behind CIS that was established in United States. US embassy denied any connection between American CIA and CIS and expressed their unhappiness over such development ***

Other than Iranian friends, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh had a large number of powerful and influential friends among middle eastern nations and in Europe. He had a team of French lawyers as friends who helped him through out his revolutionary activities and he also had strong friendship with known figures like Hafez Al-Asad of Syria, Qadhafi of Libya, and Yaser Arafat of PLO. He was so close to PLO that when PLO representative, Mahmoud Hamshahri was killed in Paris in 1972, Ghotbzadeh took care of PLO office until a new rep was dispatched by Arafat, the leader of PLO. Ghotbzadeh’s address for his passport was in Demascas (Syria), Avenue Jole Jamal while he was in constant communication and meetings with PLO leader Arafat in Lebanon and Qadhafi in Libya. Carole Jerome says in her book: “The Newsweek article by Arnaud de Borchgrave said that French Intelligence sources reported that Ghotbzadeh had "direct connection with the heads of the Communist party in France and Italy, and that he worked closely with Libyan Secret Service.". And of course Ghotbzadeh always denied that.

Carole Jerome also mentions that French DST (one of French security services) had reported Ghotbzadeh as an agent of Qadhafi as he had been followed to Tripoli by another French Secret Service (SDECE) and met Qadhafi and Libyan agents there. MOSSAD had also confirmed this information and reported that Ghotbzadeh had gone to Geneva after he left Tripoli and opened an account into which five million dollar was deposited.

In another part of the same book we read: “During the 1970’s Sadegh traveled widely on behalf of the revolutionary movement from Kuala Lampur to United States, always under watchful eyes of SAVAK, the DST, the CIA and the FBI. Oddly, he was now able to visit the United States on tourist visas, but on occasion he went with false identification from his collection of passports. When his luggage mysteriously vanished for long periods at American airports, he was unconcerned, knowing full well who was inspecting it.”

When Ghotbzadeh had entered US with Syrian passport in 1967, Immigration service rejected his application for student status and State Department cancelled his visa, which was issued in Paris. When Ghotbzadeh went to State Dept with his lawyer, Geoff Keating on his side, one of the officials just showed them a five-inch thick file while screaming at them that how they expected to deal with that file. Carole Jerome says when she managed to take that file under Freedom of Information Act 4 years after Ghotbzadeh's death, all the information except the name and description of Ghotbzadeh was still blacked out and nothing could be found. Carole Jerome says when Keating had asked Ghotbzadeh what was in the file he had replied: "The usual".

Ghotbzadeh was so close to Qadhafi that he could see him anytime he wished. Cheron, Ghtobzadeh’s lawyer told Carole Jerome that after Musa Sadr went missing, Ghotbzadeh went to see Qadhafi to ask about that. He did not disclose anything to his friend and lawyer, Cheron, but told him that he believed that Qadhafi had killed Sadr.

Ghotbzadeh had met Musa Sadr in Paris for the first time through Sadegh Tabatabai, Sadr’s nephew and later had meetings with him in Beirut where he also met Mustafa Chamran. They discussed the issues related to PLO and Lebanon in their meetings where Arafat also attended sometimes. Ms Jerome mentions that Qadhafi who considered himself champion of pan-Arabism and muslims unity provided financial support to Musa Sadr and other groups who worked in that direction but states that Ghotbzadeh did not trust Qadhafi and did not agree with his views. Musa Sadr was also in contact with Iranian government and SAVAK and when Qadhafi discovered this matter, killed Sadr without ever admitting it. The mystery around Sadr’s disappearance after he apparently left Libya for Italy was never resolved.

*** Part 2 of documents related to CIS and US government attempt to blame it on communists. ***

Ghotbzadeh also met Dr. Shariati in 1970 in a group meeting with Banisadr, Nobari, and Habibi. Shariati advised the group to send Ghotbzadeh to meet Khomeini in Najaf because he believed that Khomeini was different than other mullahs. Ghotbzadeh met Khomeini and his son Mustafa in Najaf and did not like Mustafa who was trying to control his father’s activities. Ghotbzadeh suspected Mustafa of having negative influence on Khomeini but Khomeini told him not to worry about him. According to Carole Jerome, Mustafa favored armed rebellion and this troubled Ghotbzadeh. Mustafa told Ghotbzadeh: “My father will kill more than the Shah could he imagine to realize his dreams.”. Ghotbzadeh learned about Khomeini’s “Islamic Republic” directly from him in Najaf.

When Shah vetoed the idea of Khomeini being expelled from France French government informed Ghotbzadeh that he had to leave. Ghotbzadeh’s lawyer, Vallette contacted Claude Chayet of French Quai who met Ghotbzadeh and then contacted ministry of interior and withdrew that order because he believed that Khomeini would take over the government in Iran and did not want to have bad relations with future officials of Iranian government.

In regards to delay in Khomeini's departure from Paris after Bakhtiar declared that he would not allow Khomeini's plane to enter Iran, Carole Jerome writes:
"Sadegh contacted a friend who, in turn, sounded out his old acquaintance, The American ambassador to UNESCO. In this way, he avoided contacting the American administration directly. Sadegh was then put in touch with Irving Brown, officially the representative of the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations), but less officially the representative of Central Intelligence Agency, according to a friend."

“To show how Ghtobzadeh was close to Khomeini, speaking of Ghotbzadeh lawyer friends (Bertrand Vallette and Francois Cheron) Carole Jerome writes: "One day they discovered a slight squirt in the man from Qom. Sadegh announced that he had to pick up some cologne for Khomeini. 'He likes Christian Dior stuff, Eau Sauvage,' Sadegh told Cheron who hooted in laughter.
'Khomeini? Christian Dior?' Cheron managed to sputter.
Sadegh was defensive. 'Well, why not? There's no law against smelling nice. You know Khomeini's wife, Batool?'
'Not personally' Cheron answered.
'She spends most of her time in Paris shopping for Dior dresses,' Sadegh revealed.
'I didn't think the budget ran to things like that. She must be very elegant under her chador. It seems a waste.'
'She is' Sadegh replied. Then for Cheron's edification, he launched into defense of chador". Carole Jerome writes.

This behavior of Islamic revolutionary elements and their families in Paris is inline with the behavior that Mr. Shafizadeh has given detailed information about that in his book. Same kind of behavior is reported by Mr. Hussein Broujerdi after revolutionaries entered Iran and this matter became the main reason for defecting of these two and many other individuals who were too close to center of revolution and witnessed all those disgusting and nauseating behaviors from leaders of a Islamic revolution who had come to rescue them from moral corruption.

The same French Lawyers worked in association with Christian Bourget to help Ghotbzadeh in arresting and returning Shah to Iran through negotiation with Panamanian government in 1980.

to be continued...

Next part click here

A review of Islamic revolution- Part 7

One of the saddest realities about Iranian political establishment and leadership, since the time that presence of westerners was increasing in Iran during Ghajar/Kadjar dynasty, has been the tendency for corruption among the people of highest ranks while many Iranians at the lower social classes were more loyal and committed to their country. Since more than two hundred years ago, Iranian territory became an attractive and easy target for super powers which had come with little or nothing but expected a lot and, there have always been those who were willing to sell the nation out by collaborating with them for personal gains. Another issue which has been source of many problems for our nation has been failure due to ignorance and immaturity of educated Iranians and Iranian intellectual community which should have had shouldered some of the responsibilities in leading the nation towards better judgment of its national and political interests. Despite a lot of work which, had been done in a relatively short period of time during Pahlavi era to train a new generation of statesmen by sending groups of students to be educated and become familiar with modern societies, many of same educated people became tools to destroy all the hopes of our nation for better future.

From those, there were some who held high positions within the system and also some who were outside the system but did their best to destroy it with help of external foes. It is obvious that the destructive effects of first group was a lot greater than second while the second group would never be able to accomplish much without existence of the first group. So many years have passed from those chaotic days and many things have come to light. Today almost everyone knows about the extent of effect of obscure figures like General Fardoust as an internal element who worked against the system while holding a very sensitive position in it. It is important to know that he was not the only person in highest positions in previous regime who covertly worked against the system in collaboration with the foreign governments who had interest in destroying that system while pretending to be friends and trying to be helpful.

Ofira Seliktar, an Israeli scholar and political scientist in her book about Iranian revolution, “The Failing of Crystal Ball Test” quotes a statement from William Sullivan, the last ambassador of United States to Iran saying: “there were ‘those’ in State Department ‘who were so strongly opposed to the Shah because of human right abuses of his regime that they wished to see him collapse no matter what the consequences for United States and its allies.’”

Knowing a little about history of relations between United States and other nations and remembering the stories of American meddling and invasions in different parts of the world, from Vietnam to Cuba, from Korea to Chili, from Grenada to Panama and many other places, this passive statement by Mr. Sullivan about Iran with such huge strategic values as a country to the north of Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf where more than two third of non-communist world energy and more than 90% of NATO’s energy needs pass through, can only be interpreted as a joke. This argument about importance of Iran in the politics of the west becomes more clear when we look at the geographic location of the country to the south of the Soviet Union where United States had setup major surveillance stations for constant monitoring of Soviet activities. All of this can tell us that United States and its allies were absolutely certain that Shah’s departure from Iran, not only would not weaken their position in Iran but also will provide them with a more devoted and less annoying allied regime which its leaders would be happy to have their hands on enormous wealth which they did not even dream of earlier.

Interestingly enough, Mr. Sullivan in his cable communication to Washington regarding coming of Khomeini to power suggests: “.. if the Shah fell and Khomeini took over, all was not lost.” . Carole Jerome, a journalist who accompanied Khomeini in the plane to Iran and the author of The Man in The Mirror continues: “His assessment was that the new government would be staunchly anti-Soviet and that Khomeini would remain a Gandhi-like figure. The main drawback was that Iran would become anti-Israeli. 'Thinking unthinkable' he called it."

Was it really “thinking unthinkable”? Was it possible that American policy makers did not know about teachings of Khomeini even though they had kept interest in him since 1963? Mr. Sulivan in his book, “Mission to Iran” states that he spent a few weeks on studying a variety of issues about Iran before leaving for Tehran. According to Mr. Sullivan, he conducted a comprehensive study on possibility of a “change” in Iran’s behavior towards Americans. He checked and contacted all American companies, which were in some sort of business with Iranian government. Mr. Sullivan asked all of them to be prepared to reduce the number of their employees and even leave Iran all together. This matter was very strange to some of the companies, which were involved in projects like manufacturing of military equipments and their maintenance in Iran but the advisory was very clear and they had no choice but to abide. As part of his studies, Mr. Sullivan had made assessment of loss of investments by American companies and designed solutions to reduce those damages. Mr. Sullivan also contacted some of the opposition elements in United States without mentioning any name. All of these and much more are documented in black and white and can only give us this impression that, despite some of later statements by Mr. Sullivan, U.S. government was not venturing in unfamiliar territories by supporting Khomeini.

There is one more point that I would like to mention here before moving on to other stories from inside the revolution. Carole Jerome who had spoken to William Sullivan quotes him in her book (The Man in The Mirror) that in a meeting with Shah: “….the Shah angrily launched into a ten-minute harangue. He listed each of the marches, demonstrations and strikes that had taken place, concluding, '...This cannot be the amateur work of spontaneous opposition. All the evidence indicate sophisticated planning.' The Shah turned to face Sullivan. 'And I have decided that it must all be result of foreign intrigue. What bothers me is that this intrigue is far beyond capabilities of KGB. It must therefore involve the British and American CIA'”. After that, Shah expressed his confusion over sudden turning of CIA against him while Sullivan provided some incomplete information about demonstrations and how they were funded and blamed it all on bazaaris. Mr. Sullivan then concluded that Shah was paranoid but overwhelming evidences are available today, which can confirm the Shah's suspicions at that time.

Carole Jerome who worked for Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) was appointed to her position in Paris during mid 1970’s when she was 26 years old. She met Sadegh Ghotbzadeh a few years later for the first time and her love story with Ghotbzadeh coincided with the time when Islamic revolution was close to its final stages. Around the same time that Carole moved to Paris, a young Iranian butcher lived in a village around Najaf-abad of Isfahan called Ghahderijan. His name was Jafar Shafizadeh and he ran his father’s butcher shop for living. According to his memories, which have been organized and published by late Siavash Bashiri (1), his life turned upside down one day, when he was asked by Mehdi Hashemi, a loyal, respectful and generous customer for a favor in exchange for a considerable pay in summer of the year 1975. That favor was, to help Mehdi Hashemi with reception for a party of some friends from ranking clerics in an obscure location while keeping this matter from everyone including his own family.

The offer was too tempting for Mr. Shafizadeh to pass as he was a young uneducated villager whose dream was just to have a nice butcher shop with enough revenue to support him and his parents. The money that Jafar received from Mehdi Hashemi for two weeks work was beyond his imaginations. He did not even make that money in the whole year. During the two weeks, he saw all the guests, which included eleven mullahs and four non-mullah people. He did not know anyone of them at that time but later he found out who they were as they all took important positions in the Islamic revolution which had entered a new stage in that summer day of the year 1975. The most important figure in that crowd was none other than ayatollah Beheshti. Others included: Mohammad Montazeri, Javad Bahonar, Sadegh Khalkhali, Fazlollah Mahallati, Ayatollah Taheri, ayatollah Khademi, ayatollah Saneii, Sadooghi Yazdi, Dastgheyb Shirazi, Meshkini and four non-mullah: Dr. Salavati, Dr. Minachi, Gholamabbas Tavassoli, and Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani. Ali Akbar Parvaresh, a close associate of Mehdi Hashemi, was also present. This meeting took place a year after late Shah was diagnosed with mild Lymphoma and a year before massacre of ayatollah Shamsabadi and his family in the same village.

From that point on Jafar Shafizadeh, a simple young and talented villager with very limited education, entered a circle, which took him through events that he could never imagine before. In this new phase in his life, Jafar met many people who would hold highest positions in revolutionary government later, and visited many places that he never thought of previously. After the meeting ended, Mehdi Hashemi paid Jafar handsomely, and told him to get ready to go and get his passport next morning, without waiting for his agreement. Next day, Hashemi told him that he will be sent to an important mission and all his financial concerns will be taken care of and there should not be any problem. Jafar who, according to himself, would even kill anyone if Mehdi Hashemi asked him, became special servant for Mr. Hashemi after that and drove him around town while Mr. Hashemi, a devoted Muslim who even performed sermon in some religious sessions, took care of his own business and continued to pay Jafar generously.

Sometime after Jafar’s passport was ready, him and Gholamabbas Tavassoli departed for Paris and after a few days in Paris, Jafar was given a closed envelope and directed to airport to go to Syria where he was received by some Syrian military personnel and taken to a camp. Along with a few dozens of other people from different Islamic nations, Jafar received special training for guerrilla combat activities. Many of the people in that group were Iranians and all of them had higher education than Jafar. Some of them were university students or have completed their university. It was one of those days in training camp when Jafar was given the news by one of Syrian officers about arrest of Mehdi Hashemi and some of Shafizadeh family members for killings of ayatollah Shamsabadi and his family.

to be continued..

A review of Islamic revolution- Part 6

Some of declassified communication documents of US embassy in Tehran indicate how seriously Americans were concerned about relations between Iranian government and the consortium in which American companies had gained a big share since 1953.
In this document, American embassy gives detailed account of Shah's plans for oil after 1979 and clearly mentions the threatening statement of American ambassador which indicated that if the problem was not resolved to the satisfactory of oil companies then there would be problems between Iran and the home countries of the oil companies (which were none other than UK and US). This document alone shows how US government acted as representative of oil companies to push their agenda through show of muscle while in many other occasions denies having any influence over decisions made by those companies. If we believe that then it means that US government, in its relation with other nations, is always acting as protector of some companies which, in the views of US government, their interests is the same as the interests of United States. Whether this is a fair behavior towards the interests of American tax payer or not, is something which should be dealt with by American people who are always wondering why people in other parts of the world don't like them so much!

1979-1-2, 1979-1-2

1979-2-2, 1979-2-2

1979-3-2, 1979-3-2

1979-4-2, 1979-4-2

A review of Islamic revolution- Part 5

In an interview with VOA in March 2008, Hossein Faraji, a former staff of Iranian National Radio and TV who worked as member of Persian broadcasting service in “Deutsche Welle” of Germany, spoke about Sadegh Ghotbzadeh. Mr. Hossein Faraji said that he knew Ghotbzadeh from school years when they were classmates and was surprised when he called Paris one day to speak to someone named “haji Sadegh” and the person who spoke to him turned to be no one but Sadegh Ghtobzadeh, a friend from school days. Mr. Faraji had been given mission by his office in Germany to go to Paris and see the Khomeini’s camp up close and prepare a report. He was invited by Ghotbzadeh to go to Paris and, when he went there, he could see that Ghotbzadeh was the most influential person in the circle of people around Khomeini in Paris and everyone came to him if there was any issue.

Let’s leave Ghtobzadeh here as we will be talking about him a lot more but for now, let’s go back a few years to look at the source of some issues which had severe effect on Iran-US relations so that the idea of an “alternative” solution to Iran’s “problems” became very attractive for American governments of both parties.

Growing needs for funding different development plans after initial success of the 1963 reforms under name of “White Revolution”, had created an urge to find new resources and more capital to support such growth. Some people claim that late Shah was “inspired” by American government during J.F. Kennedy to implement such reforms but this is very far from truth. While American administrations, including Kennedy’s, have always had certain demands from Shah in the name of “reform” but there has never been a blue print for such reforms other than recommending use of certain people (i.e.: late Dr. Amini) to form the government. During Amini’s government, Mr. Arsanjani, the minister of agriculture initiated a land reform program, which faced strong resistance by big Landowners and caused a lot of problems for the government. At the same time mishandling of educational system by Mr. Derakhshesh, minister of education, had caused a lot of problems in the country resulting in widespread dissatisfaction with government, that was growing very fast.

Absence of the parliament, which was dissolved by Dr. Amini in the beginning of his government as a precondition for him to form the government, had created a chaotic condition with large deficit and increasing unemployment and other problems, that was getting out of control quickly. As a result, Dr. Amini was dismissed and Asadollah Alam replaced him. About a year later, Shah introduced his own reform with 6 articles which became known as white revolution later. The reform bill was put to referendum and approved by the people. A few months later Khomeini declared his opposition to the reforms and confrontation of Khomeini’s followers with government began.

As reforms moved forward, the government came under more pressure to find new resources to fund different plans. US government which apparently supported reform programs was not willing to provide any more funding even during Dr. Amini’s government. Iran had no choice but to push for more revenue from oil companies and this matter became increasingly annoying to US government. Even though they told Iranian government that they did not have any control over oil companies but continuously advised Iranian government to exercise moderation in their negotiations and requests from oil companies to avoid any issues because otherwise Iran’s relations with the US government would be affected! From the other side, while refusing to accept Iranian oil through a government to government deal, they advised Iran not to seek such solution with others either because they won’t be able to market their own oil so Iran had no choice but to sell its oil through the oil consortium.

The oil problem in relation between Iranian and US governments was so severe sometimes that in one case even a possible “showdown” with Iranian government, over its request for $1 billion verses $900 millions which consortium had accepted, was debated in state department! Iranian government of course was not aware of this matter while counting heavily on friendship of United States and its leaders but they finally got what they wanted and even more. In year 1971, Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor to President Nixon, had a conversation with the Shah that was reported by American embassy as follows (which shows the degree of trust that Shah had in Americans):

“Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Shah felt the people of the Near East needed to fear some sort of US-Soviet deal that would work to their disadvantage. The Shah said he did not feel so because the US is not the kind of nation to sell out its friends.”

This conversation happened during the times which Iranian government was vigorously working to increase its revenue from oil exports for funding ambitious industrial developments and expansion and modernization of its military. Intense negotiation with oil consortium had caused even some unfriendly exchanges between Shah and US embassy over the concerns of United States regarding supply of oil to NATO and European allies. United States government always stressed on continuous flow of oil to the allies and more importantly, the NATO and at the same time recommended that development plans to be implemented in slower pace to avoid “issues”.

Shah had his own reasons not to comply with that request while pressing Americans for more advanced military equipments but from the communication documents of US government, it was obvious that this story could not continue for long.

to be continued...

A review of Islamic revolution- Part 4-1

Part of US Ambassador's report in 1972 in response to a request by State Department after celebration of 2500 years of Iranian monarchy. I will make more images available later.

A variety of issues are discussed in this report which includes detailed information about Iranian military strength and also about views of Shah regarding presence of American forces in Persian Gulf which has been one of the sources of tension in Iran-U.S. relations.

Shah-trouble1, part 1 of a 9 page program

shah-trouble2, part 2 of 9 page embassy doc

shah-trouble3, part3 of 9 page doc from embassy